"Reverse Gradualism", Investment Collapse and Monetary Degradation in Russia in the 1990s by Rozmainsky, I.V.
I. V. Rozmainsky 
5 
Економічний вісник Донбасу № 4(38), 2014 
SCIENTIFIC ARTICLES 
 
 
 
UDC 330.322: 336.74 
I. V. Rozmainsky, 
PhD (Economics),  
Russia, Saint-Petersburg 
 
"REVERSE GRADUALISM", INVESTMENT COLLAPSE  
AND MONETARY DEGRADATION IN RUSSIA IN THE 1990s 
 
I. Introduction  
In the 1990s The Russian transitional economy 
was characterized by many adverse economic process-
es, and this paper will focus on the two of these ones. 
The first one was the long and biggest fall in output 
and fixed capital investment. The second was monetary 
degradation (this term will be explained below). These 
phenomena (especially the first one) reflected clearly 
failure of economic reforms in Russia, because large 
negative economic growth implied nothing but fiasco. 
Why the Liberal Reforms of the 1990s were so unsuc-
cessful?  
The goal of this article is to give the answers to 
this and some other questions. I will show that roots of 
economic failure of Russia in the 1990s are in the type 
of the strategy of economic reforms. I called it "reverse 
gradualism"; indeed it is the newest label for the shock 
therapy strategy, as I will explain below. Such strategy 
generates the criminalization of the economy, which, in 
turn, does the adverse influence on investment, output 
and finance. The interaction between investment sector 
and monetary processes deepened crisis. The general 
outcomes are underdeveloped economy, technological 
backwardness and ineffective institutional environ-
ment. These ones can be considered as one of the roots 
of social and political processes started after reelection 
of Putin in 2012 in Russia. 
The structure of the paper is the following. The 
Section 2 describes (in detail) the essence of gradual-
ism and its important elements and also explains why 
shock therapy strategy – at least, in the case of Rus-
sia – is nothing but "reverse gradualism". The Section 
3 illustrates the ideology of the Russian transitional 
reforms. The Section 4 describes both concrete carry-
ing-out of reforms in Russia and how these reforms 
generated criminalization of the economy. The Section 
5 describes the influence of criminalization on fall in 
fixed capital investment. The Section 6 contains the 
description of the influence of the same process on 
monetary degradation. Section 7 tells about the interac-
tion between changes in fixed capital investment ac-
tivity and financial development in the developed 
countries (including "new industrial countries") and in 
Russia. The Section 8 is the conclusion.   
2. Gradualism versus Shock therapy or "Nor-
mal Gradualism" versus "Reverse Gradualism"  
The problem of the gradualism/shock therapy 
choice is widely discussed among the economists who 
are concerned with the economics of transition (Dewat-
ripont & Roland, 1995, 1997; Аslund, 1996 etc). It 
seems to me that, however, underestimation of the 
essence of gradualism takes place. Gradualism is the 
sequencing of reforms. Yes, of course, it is true. But 
this definition is not sufficient. It does not give the 
information about duration of each of these reforms. 
This point is very important.  
What reforms constitute gradualist transition to 
the market economy? I think that it is necessary to 
mention the following ones.  
a) The creation of the legal framework for the 
market economy. I mean such things as clear system of 
property rights, contract law, the definitions of rights 
and duties of private and state enterprises, the proce-
dure of the bankruptcy, provision of the general coher-
ence of laws (for example, coherence of instructions of 
the President with laws of legislative organs) etc (see 
Udovenko and Gurinovich (1994)).  
b) The development of private sector.  
c) Demonopolization and restructuring of the en-
terprises.  
d) Privatization.  
e) Price liberalization.  
f) The departure of the government from the 
economy (in particular, from the sphere of the enter-
prises administration and management).  
What especial feature of this list? Each successive 
reform takes less time than preceding one. The dura-
tion of price liberalization or of departure of the gov-
ernment from the business administration can be equal 
to one day. On the other hand, the creation of the good 
legal framework or the development of (even small) 
private sector can take a few years. More early reforms 
are longer (and also complicated).  
It means that shock therapy policy is the immedi-
ate introduction of all reforms but is not immediate 
completion of all ones! If that policy takes place, logi-
cally later reforms are ended more early because of its 
extremely small relative duration! For example, imme-
Economic Theory 
I. V. Rozmainsky 
 6 
Економічний вісник Донбасу № 4(38), 2014 
diate introduction of both the development of private 
sector and the departure of the government from the 
business administration simply means that, as a (inter-
mediate) result, many enterprises will remain without 
any administration (Raskov, 1995)! Or the attempts to 
create simultaneously privatized enterprises and legal 
framework will lead to the situation of the "game with-
out rules". Both such situations took place in Russia in 
the 1990s.  
I would like to note that the shock therapy policy 
ex ante has been transformed into the "reverse gradual-
ism" ex post. Those reforms that must (from economic 
point of view) be implemented later, take place more 
early (it is the definition of the "reverse gradualism"). 
Such "bad" succession complicates the transition to the 
market economy and also generates chaos and increas-
es the uncertainty of the future. But the main evil of the 
"reverse gradualism" is the creation of the prerequisites 
for criminalization of the economy. In other words, 
such policy gives the broad possibilities for the getting 
income by cheatings, plundering and other "black" (i.e. 
illegal) kinds of economic activity (I will show it in the 
Section 4).  
Broadly speaking, the above reasoning implies 
that the ("normal") gradualism is the only effective 
strategy for the transition to the market economy. Pri-
vatization and price liberalization can be successful 
only if these reforms are based on clear legal frame-
work and are realized under the existence of private 
sector. It means that the time period between the initial 
decision to create the market economy and fully de-
sired liberalization must be long. But then that transi-
tion will be very effective, as experience of China 
(country which was gradualist very consistently) 
shows. Quick reforms in the spirit of shock therapy 
approach, on the other hand, can lead to the sharp eco-
nomic slump and to many social problems.  
So there is effectiveness/duration trade-off. More 
effective reforms are more long and vice versa. The 
effective policy a la ("normal") gradualism is slow. 
The quickest shock therapy measures (the "reverse 
gradualism") are harmful for the macroeconomic per-
formance and financial development.  
But the political constrains also take place. Many 
economists believe that high costs of reversal are dis-
advantage of shock therapy policy (Dewatripont & 
Roland, 1997). But if there are both extreme political 
instability and the threat of the seizure of power by the 
reactionary forces, then transitional reforms must be 
quick and irreversible in order to make the market 
economy rising inevitable. In that case high costs of 
reversal are the advantage of shock therapy policy 
(Aslund, 1996) because in such politically adverse 
situation rapidity is more useful "good" than effective-
ness and macroeconomic performance (it is the point of 
view of many extreme liberal reformists). It is such 
circumstances that took place in Russia, when the Rus-
sian government made the decision to create the market 
economy.  
3. The Ideology of Transitional Reforms in 
Russia  
In order to understand especial features of the 
Russian economic reforms, it is necessary to ascertain 
its ideology. According to my opinion, this ideology 
was characterized by the following points.  
a) The idea of the "jump into the market". Many 
economists said: "the main is to jump into the market, 
all the rest does not matter". In other words, for many 
Russians the market economy was not the means but 
the goal. The market became the idol. “Towards the 
Market at any cost”. I think that it is the reflection of 
the essential features of the psychology of the Rus-
sians. "All or nothing" is the principle of many Russian 
people. For such people the "cost/benefit" thinking 
(which is so typical for the Americans) is not charac-
teristic.  
b) The Hayekian idea of the "spontaneous rising 
of the market institutions". This idea occupied the 
brains of Gaidar and many other reformists. According 
to this principle, the creation of the market economy 
must not be concerned with the government actions. 
The government should depart from the economy and 
open the way for the rising of the market institutions. 
The emergence of such institutions is the effect of the 
chaotic interactions between many atomized individu-
als. The government must not disturb the "mystery" of 
spontaneous rising of the market economy.  
c) The above-mentioned fear of the seizure of 
power by the reactionary forces, i.e. of the revenge of 
the communists. "If we will make reforms very quick-
ly, the return (to the power) of the communist forces 
cannot deteriorate situation, because the transition to 
the market will become irreversible". It is the way of 
thinking of many Russian reformists. "The main thing 
is to make the reforms as quick as possible".  
These fundamental principles had laid the founda-
tion of the Russian transitional reforms. The analysis of 
these principles shows that such reforms were extreme-
ly quick and completely "unreasoned" and "unstruc-
tured". The implementation of these reforms generated 
big chaos and increased the uncertainty of the future in 
Russia.  
4. "Reverse Gradualism" and Criminalization 
of the Economy in Russia  
By the 1991 in Russia the state organs of the en-
terprises administration were abolished. In the January 
of 1992 price liberalization took place. In 1992 - 1994 
the main part of privatization took place. But these 
reforms were executed in conditions of the absence of 
such important elements of the healthy market econo-
my as a clear legal framework, private sector and com-
petitive environment. In other words, economic agents 
got large possibilities to "make money" by illegal 
means. The main such means was the “nomenklaturna-
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ja privatizacia”. It took place when managers of state 
enterprises created false firms and transmitted re-
sources of these enterprises into such firms. These and 
similar actions (together with famous "rent-seeking 
activity") displaced "usual" productive and investment 
activity. The point is that because of the government 
departure the property which belonged to the state 
became belonging to nobody. It led to massive redistri-
bution of incomes and criminal formation of capital of 
many economic agents. More exactly, the most part of 
the Russian private capital was created because of such 
"reverse gradualism" by criminal and semi-criminal 
methods, that is, by "nomenklaturnaja privatizacia", 
speculation, theft, rent-seeking activity and so on. 
These phenomena became possible owing to the ab-
sence of clear property rights and other "rules of 
game". Such institutions are the necessary condition 
for domination of the motive of profit maximization on 
the base of productive and investment activity. In the 
transitional economy these institutions must be created 
in the first phase of "normal" gradualist reform and 
make the base for the subsequent measures (see the 
Section 2). In Russia in the 1990s this base was not 
satisfactory. That is why as in the beginning of the 
transition as in the end of the 1990s, speculation, cheat-
ings and transactions with rights, privileges and licens-
es generated more benefit to economic agents than 
"normal" productive and investment activity.  
In 1992 and 1993 the amount of criminal appro-
priation by private agents was equal to 75-80% of 
GDP; in 1996 (when law framework became already a 
little more clear) it was equal to 12-15% of GDP 
(Shmeljov, 1997, p. 32).  
As a result in the Russian economy in the 1990s 
there was rising of informal rules of game created by 
criminal groups. Criminalization of the economy was 
self-intensifying. It did the adverse influence on the 
investment and financial sector, as I will show in the 
next two sections.  
5. Criminalization of the Economy and Col-
lapse of Fixed Capital Investment in Russia  
It is known that fixed capital investments are the 
moving force of macroeconomic dynamics. Such in-
vestments increase the level of aggregate demand, 
expand productive possibilities of the economy (La-
voie, 2006, ch. 5) and are the channel of innovations’ 
diffusion. Without fixed capital investment there are no 
economic growth and technical progress. The conse-
quences of the slack capital investment activity are 
stagnation and technological degradation. The long 
decrease in such investment leads to the heavy slump.  
But fixed capital investment activity is concerned 
with the long-run estimates and expectations of the 
future. The necessary condition for the carrying-out of 
fixed capital investment projects is (more or less) sta-
ble socio-economic environment. In other words, fixed 
capital investment is the decreasing function of the 
(high) uncertainty of the future, economic and political 
instability, "non-clear" legal framework, the absence of 
certain guarantees from the government etc (Rozmain-
sky, 2013)..  
It is stupidly clear that conditions which are fa-
vorable for fixed capital investment and ones which are 
favorable for criminalization of the economy are op-
posed each other. Criminal and semi-criminal kinds of 
activity - stealing, illegal speculations, "games" with 
rights and licenses - are the "fishing in troubled wa-
ters". Criminalization needs chaos, instability and 
uncertainty. Time horizon of the representatives of 
criminal groups is extremely short-term. The goal of 
such economic agents is to make money as quickly as 
possible ("while waters are still troubled"). Such agents 
are characterized by investor myopia which means that 
agents evaluate consequences of their decisions only 
over short-time horizon (Rozmainsky, 2013). Criminal 
actions are inconsistent with any long-run activity. In 
short, the uncertainty of the future, socio-economic 
instability and helter-skelter with legal framework both 
increased the uncertainty of the future and created 
prerequisites for the success of criminal activity.  
On the other hand, investment activity needs the 
"calm waters". Time horizon of "fixed capital inves-
tors" is very long (5-40 years). The goal of such agents 
is to earn maximal profit during a very prolonged time 
period. Any uncertainty, instability and chaos are ex-
tremely disturbing the fixed capital investment activity.  
So if in the economy the most profitable activity 
becomes short-term and extreme short-term one, that it 
means unattractiveness of fixed capital investment. 
Such investments are impossible in the system of 
short-term horizon economic agents. At the same time 
in this system criminal activity can be gainful.  
Two of the most harmful effects of the Russian 
"reverse gradualism" were "troubling of waters" and 
forming of short-term orientation of economic agents. 
These effects are interactive. "Troubled waters" were 
ideal for criminal activity; such activity, in turn, "trou-
bles waters" in a more degree. So "reverse gradualism' 
in Russia generated catastrophic effects to fixed capital 
investment activity. The main channel of influence of 
these effects was criminalization of the economy. The 
profitability of criminal and semi-criminal actions 
implied non-profitability of fixed capital investment 
because of sharp distinctions in accompanying condi-
tions (short/long time horizon, non-clear/clear legal 
framework, high/low level of uncertainty of the future 
etc).  
But criminalization was harmful for fixed capital 
investment activity not only because of these listed 
forces (of "troubled/calm waters"). The second funda-
mental reason was the criminal origin of new private 
capital. Many Russian reformists believed in the 
Marx's theory of "primitive accumulation of capital". 
"Let them accumulate as they (new entrepreneurs) 
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like". According to the point of many Russian reform-
ists, criminally formed private capital was much better 
than absence of private one. Reformists believed that 
new entrepreneurs will invest own criminal capitals in 
the Russian economy and, therefore, help both to trans-
it to the market system and to begin economic growth. 
And then rich criminals will become honest (fixed 
capital) investors (Davydov, 1997).  
It turned out that this conception is not true. Crim-
inal origin of capital induced owner of such capital to 
invest outside the country where this capital was 
formed because that owner wants to conceal his (or 
her) crime from authorities of this country. This "law" 
is the main reason for the huge capital outflow form 
Russia during the transition to the market system. An-
nual capital outflow (in the 1990s) equaled about $ 50 
billions. Foreign financial and productive assets were 
the main (and very strong) competitor to Russian fixed 
capital for Russian investors. The glaring blunder of 
Russian reformists was creation of favorable condi-
tions for the concentration of capital at criminal 
groups; for example, in 1997 in Russia domestic and 
foreign criminals possessed 55 per cent of capital and 
80 per cent of voting stocks (Davydov, 1997, P. 116). 
As a result, those who wanted to invest in fixed capital, 
had no money, and those who had money (these people 
were criminals), did not want to make it.  
In 1999 investment in Russian fixed capital was 
equal less than 25 per cent of its level in 1990 (and 
during the transition period R&D expenditures, accord-
ing to the studies of Shmeljov (1996), fell by ten 
times). That collapse was much more awful that the 
American Great Depression. Such collapse, as I 
showed, was the effect of failed "reverse gradualism" 
which led to the "troubled waters" (high uncertainty, 
absence of clear legal framework, "short-termisation" 
etc) and concentration of capital at criminal groups.  
6. Criminalization of the Economy and Mone-
tary degradation in Russia  
In developed countries (including new industrial 
ones) financial evolution takes place. This term means 
rising and spreading of new kinds of money (and qua-
si-money) and new financial practices. I mean liability 
management, securitization, off-balance sheet activities 
etc. As I will show in the Section 7, there is a positive 
interaction between financial evolution and economic 
growth. The former facilitates fixed capital investment 
activity, which, in turn, is the reason for the further 
development of financial system.  
In Russia during the transition period there was 
monetary degradation. I use this term as a reflection of 
increase of primitive mediums of exchange and means 
of payment - cash, inter-enterprise arrears ("non-
payments") and barter - and (relative and absolute) 
decrease of "advanced" kinds of money. The negative 
influence of such degradation on investment activity 
will also be shown in the Section 7. In this Section I 
will describe criminal roots of monetary degradation in 
Russia.  
The point is that criminalization needs "adequate" 
financing. Financing is "adequate" for criminal activi-
ty, if it allows to conceal outcomes of (criminal) trans-
actions and makes more difficult of all calculation and 
accounting. In other words, such financing creates 
conditions for above-mentioned "fishing in troubled 
waters". Bank money is not good for it. But any new, 
"advanced" kinds of money and quasi-money (certifi-
cates on deposit, repurchase agreements etc) are bank 
money or are created by the financial institutions’ ac-
tivity. Therefore, to some extent, financial evolution 
disturbs criminal activity, because it makes all transac-
tions "transparent" for the statistical services and tax 
authorities.  
On the other hand, primitive kinds of mediums of 
exchange can help criminal groups to hide its actions.  
a) Cash. Black cash ("chjornyj nal") is cash in-
flows and outflows which are not reflected in ("offi-
cial") enterprises accounting. Such kind of financing is 
the simplest way to hide income from taxation. In Rus-
sia in the 1990s so-called "black cash" was widespread. 
The share of cash in the total Russian money supply 
increased in the 1990s (for example, in December of 
1991 cash/M2 ratio was equal to 0.18, in December of 
1993 it was equal to 0.36, and in October of 1998 it 
was more than 0.38). It is reflection of criminalization 
of the economy (Nesterov & Vakurin, 1995).  
b) Barter. Barter is ideal means to conceal in-
comes. Under barter pricing is very muddle, and mate-
rial things flows are reflected in accounting only partly 
(or not reflected at all). Multi-stage barter exchanges 
are based on "word of honor" and personal connections 
between enterprises top managers and very often un-
knowable for the other workers. (Makarov and Kleyn-
er, 1997). So barter allows to hide from tax authorities 
and police enormous amount of wealth. The cases were 
known when managers of some Russian enterprises 
bought "Mersedeses", and at the same time "simple" 
workers could not get wage during the months. In 1996 
in Russia barter financed 34-50 per cent of turnover of 
manufacturing enterprises, 70-80 per cent of transac-
tions with raw, and 75 per cent of turnover of small 
businesses producing nonconsumption goods 
(Makarov and Kleyner, 1997, p.26). According to so-
ciological interrogatories, in 1996 Russian firms fi-
nanced 35-38 per cent of its transactions by barter (and 
only 17-23 per cent by bank money and 9-12 per cent 
by cash); the share of transactions financed by barter 
had risen in this year by 15 per cent (Klepach, 1997, 
p.45, 54).  
c) Inter-enterprise arrears ("non-payments"). Ar-
rears did the influence on criminalization through three 
channels. In the first place, mutual arrears between 
firms are not but specific kind of barter. In the second 
place, "non-payments" allowed enterprise-creditor to 
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delay tax payments. In the third place, rising of "bad" 
arrears induced firm-creditor to ask criminals to take 
debt principal and interest away from firm-debtor. In 
other words, in this last case, incentives to cooperation 
between firms and criminal groups appeared. Only in 
1996 annual increase of inter-enterprise arrears was 
equal to 16 per cent (Klepach, 1997, p.54). In January 
of 1997 "mismatured" inter-enterprise arrears were 
more than 23 per cent of Russian GDP (Shmeljov, 
1997. p 26).  
Degradation of monetary system was both cause 
and consequence of criminalization of the Russian 
economy in the 1990s; the former was the reaction of 
financial sector on development of criminal tendencies; 
but such degradation, in turn, created conditions for 
intensification of these tendencies.  
Monetary degradation (and especially barteriza-
tion) was harmful for economic development and tech-
nical progress. It increased transaction costs - because 
the carrying-out of exchanges becomes more difficult - 
and reduced allocative efficiency (Makarov & Kleyner, 
1997, p.33; Malahov, 1997, p.86). But, possibly, the 
main evil of monetary degradation was negative influ-
ence on fixed capital investment. 
7. Fixed Capital Investment and Financial De-
velopment: Very Important Interaction  
In orthodox macroeconomics the problem of fi-
nancing fixed capital investment and economic growth 
is, unfortunately, not studied. Only some representa-
tives of Post Keynesian Economics explored this ques-
tion (Minsky, 1977, 1985, 1986; Carvalho, 1992; 
Pollin, 1994; see also Rozmainsky, 1995, 1996).  
On the one hand, permanent expansion of invest-
ment possibilities increases enterprises demand for 
finance and induces banks and other financial institu-
tions to search new ways to satisfy this demand. In 
these circumstances financial institutions try to escape 
from the central bank (reserve) control; to make it, 
these institutions create new kinds of money and finan-
cial practices (already mentioned liability management, 
securitization, use of credit lines etc). So banks and 
other financial institutions get the possibility to create 
money independently on central bank policies. Money 
supply becomes endogenous (Chick, 1992; Chick & 
Dow, 1988; Niggle, 1990, 1991; Rozmainsky, 1995; 
Nozdran and Berezin, 1993).  
On the other hand, such financial evolution ex-
pands opportunities for financing expensive and long-
term fixed capital investment. The financial barriers to 
investment projects weaken. The increase in the pro-
ductive possibilities becomes quicker. The economy 
grows more rapidly. All this is the essence of men-
tioned interaction between economic growth and finan-
cial development.  
The above-described story is about positive 
tendencies in economic and financial development. But 
negative tendencies can also take place. It is case of 
Russia in the 1990s. I showed already how criminaliza-
tion (induced by "reverse gradualism") generated both 
collapse of fixed capital investment and degradation of 
monetary system. The problem is that now even under 
the successful struggle with criminal tendencies in-
vestment fall and monetary degradation can interact 
and deepen each other. On the one hand, fall in invest-
ment will decrease demand for finance and, therefore, 
do not stimulate financial development. On the other 
hand, decrease in real (deflated) amount of financial 
sources (because of monetary degradation) will narrow 
possibilities for financing investment expenditures and, 
consequently, economic growth. Growth is impossible 
without sufficient financial resources, without separa-
tion of finance (financial sources of investment) from 
savings (Carvalho, 1992; Pollin, 1994) because other-
wise for increase of investment it is necessary at first to 
increase savings; but owing to famous the "paradox of 
thrift" such increase will lead to output fall.  
I mentioned already the data about a level of in-
vestment fall in Russia and about a monetary degrada-
tion measured by increase of share of cash in the total 
money supply. Now I would like to note that during the 
period of 1992-1995 the price level rose by 8,500 
times, money supply (including cash) rose by 230 
times (and cash rise was more than increase in the total 
money supply). The M2/GDP ratio was equal to 0.7 in 
1991 (this figure is typical for industrial countries) and 
0.1 in 1996 (Shmeljov, 1997, P.26). According to 
Shmeljov, the total money supply was less than aggre-
gate money demand of the economy by 15-20 times. 
The quasi-money/total money supply ratio was equal to 
about 0.01-0.03 during all the transition period in the 
1990s (in the developed countries now this ratio is 
equal to about 2/3). In other words, in Russia M2 and 
M3 were not created. Nozdran and Berezin (1993, 
P.39) believe that the reason for it is the investment 
collapse. I agree with this point of view. So we can see 
that combination of investment collapse and decrease 
of real (deflated) money supply (especially "advanced" 
kinds of money) was the reality in Russia in the 1990s.  
During this period there was threat for Russia to 
get into dangerous "trap of absence of financial sources 
of growth". This trap is the part of or even the reason 
for the "trap of equilibrium at low level of income" 
described by Kornai (1994). Moreover, during all 
1990s gross domestic output and investment fall in 
spite of the government's promises of "stabilization".  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper I tried to describe the essence and 
some negative consequences of shock therapy policy of 
transition to the market system. I called this policy 
"reverse gradualism" because in fact all reforms cannot 
be completed immediately (as the "philosophy" of 
shock therapy postulates); there is full realization of 
reforms with less duration; it is these reforms that 
should from economic point of view be last. For exam-
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ple, privatization must be implemented only after crea-
tion of clear legal framework; and attempts to make 
both reforms simultaneously lead to situation when 
state enterprises are privatized without clear system of 
law.  
So "reverse gradualism" increased uncertainty, in-
stability and creates law chaos. All these phenomena 
generated profitability of short-term kinds of economic 
activity, first of all, criminal and semi-criminal "opera-
tions": stealing (for example, "appropriation" of state 
property by managers of state enterprises without state 
administration), illegal speculations, transactions with 
rights, privileges and licenses etc. Economic agents 
tried to "fish in troubled waters". Criminalization of the 
economy took place.  
This process, in turn, had two adverse effects. In 
the first place, criminalization was inconsistent with 
long-term fixed capital investment activity. Criminali-
zation "troubled waters" in a more degree; at the same 
time fixed capital investment projects can be executed 
only in the "calm waters" (clear legal framework, in-
cluding clear property rights and duties of government; 
low uncertainty of the future; socio-economic stability 
etc). Many agents started to behave in the manner de-
scribed by the concept of investor myopia. Further-
more, owners of criminal capital did not want invest it 
inside the country where they formed this capital (in 
order to hide crimes from police and tax authorities). 
Such criminalization generated huge capital outflow.  
In the second place, criminalization required "ad-
equate" financing, that is, financing which allows to 
conceal value of transactions from the government 
agencies (tax authorities etc). Such financing was pro-
vided by monetary degradation, i.e. spreading of primi-
tive kinds of mediums of exchange - cash, barter and 
inter-enterprise arrears ("non-payments").  
But fall in fixed capital investment and degrada-
tion of monetary system interacted and deepened each 
other. This interaction pushed the economy into the 
"trap of absence of financial sources of growth". The 
backwardness of such transitional economy from the 
developed industrial economies increased. That is why 
collapse in Russia in the 1990s was so huge. It was, to 
a large extent, a consequence of "unreasoned" "reverse 
gradualist" reforms in Russia in the 1990s.  
And the echoes of these processes are beyond the 
1990s! Let me give one example. The average age of 
equipment in the USSR and the US was equal in 1970 
to 8.4 and 6.4 years respectively, in 1990 10.8 and 7.1. 
In 2004 the same variable was equal to 6 years in the 
US and 21 years in Russia (Fedotov, 2005). So, the 
resulted technological and financial backwardness 
together with higher uncertainty is perhaps one of the 
roots of adverse political and economic processes in 
Russia after reelection of Putin in 2012. 
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Розмаїнський І. В. «Зворотний градуалізм», 
колапс інвестицій і грошова деградація в Росії в 
1990-ті роки 
У 1990-і роки російська перехідна економіка 
характеризувалася безліччю несприятливих еконо-
мічних процесів, але найважливішими були два з 
них. Перший - тривалий і величезний спад вироб-
ництва і інвестицій в основний капітал. Другий - 
грошова деградація, що була збільшенням ролі 
примітивних засобів обміну і засобів платежу - 
готівки, неплатежів і бартеру - укупі з відносним і 
абсолютним зменшенням ролі «просунутих» видів 
грошей. Мета цієї статті полягає в поясненні взає-
мозв'язків між цими процесами. Основна ідея поля-
гає в тому, що ці феномени генерувалися політи-
кою шокової терапії, яка виявилася чимось на зра-
зок «зворотного градуалізму». Останнє означає, що 
політика шокової терапії є миттєвим впроваджен-
ням усіх реформ, але не їх миттєвим завершенням. 
Якщо така політика здійснюється, то ті реформи, 
які логічно мали б бути проведені пізніше, реалі-
зуються раніше із-за їх надзвичайно малої віднос-
ної тривалості. Це і відбувалося в Росії в 1990-і 
роки.          
Ключові слова: градуалізм; інвестиції; грошова 
деградація; перехідна економіка; економічна теорія 
переходу; російська економіка. 
 
Розмаинский И. В. «Обратный градуализм», 
коллапс инвестиций и денежная деградация в 
России в 1990-е годы 
В 1990-е годы российская переходная эконо-
мика характеризовалась множеством неблагопри-
ятных экономических процессов, но самыми важ-
ными были два из них. Первый – длительный и 
громадный спад производства и инвестиций в ос-
новной капитал. Второй – денежная деградация, 
представлявшая собой увеличение роли примитив-
ных средств обмена и средств платежа – налично-
сти, неплатежей и бартера – вкупе с относительным 
и абсолютным уменьшением роли «продвинутых» 
видов денег. Цель этой статьи заключается в объ-
яснении взаимосвязей между этими процессами. 
Основная идея состоит в том, что эти феномены 
были генерированы политикой шоковой терапии, 
которая оказалась чем-то вроде «обратного градуа-
лизма». Последнее означает, что политика шоковой 
терапии является мгновенным внедрением всех 
реформ, но не их мгновенным завершением. Если 
такая политика осуществляется, то те реформы, 
которые логически должны были бы быть проведе-
ны позже, реализуются раньше из-за их чрезвычай-
но малой относительной длительности. Это и про-
исходило в России в 1990-е годы. 
Ключевые слова: градуализм; инвестиции; де-
нежная деградация; переходная экономика; эконо-
мическая теория перехода; российская экономика. 
 
Rozmainsky I. V. "Reverse Gradualism", In-
vestment Collapse and Monetary Degradation in 
Russia in the 1990s 
In the 1990s The Russian transitional economy 
was characterized by many adverse economic process-
es, but the very important are two of these ones. The 
first one was the long and biggest fall in output and 
fixed capital investment. The second was monetary 
degradation which is increase of primitive mediums of 
exchange and means of payment – cash, inter-
enterprise arrears ("non-payments") and barter – and 
(relative and absolute) decrease of "advanced" kinds of 
money. The goal of this article is to explain intercon-
nections between these processes. The main idea is that 
these phenomena were generated by shock therapy 
policy which is turned to be a something like “reverse 
gradualism”. It means that shock therapy policy is the 
immediate introduction of all reforms but is not imme-
diate completion of all ones. If that policy takes place, 
logically later reforms are ended more early because of 
its extremely small relative duration! That was a case 
of Russia in the 1990s.    
Keywords: gradualism; investment; monetary 
degradation; transitional economies; economics of 
transition; russian economy. 
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